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Injustice is a recurring theme in history, as is violence. The injustice and the violence that 
have defined many turning points in global history have habitually made their appearance 
concurrently, one reinforcing the other, as copiously documented by the periodic global 
instances of conquest, colonization, slavery, genocide and systematic sexual violence. That 
these historical events also represent historical wrongs is almost universally accepted, as is 
the view that such historical wrongs should at least be acknowledged for what they were.
1
 
And of course there are those who argue for some kind of rectification for past injustices, 
although there is very little agreement on what form this should take.
2
 
                                                          
Earlier versions of this article were presented in Boston (Northeastern), London (LSE), New 
York (Columbia), and Pavia. I’m especially grateful to Emanuela Ceva, Margaret Moore, 
Anne Phillips and Lea Ypi for their comments and suggestions, and to three anonymous 
referees for their insightful appraisals. 
1
 In this paper I will use the terms ‘historical injustice’ and ‘historical wrongs’ 
interchangeably. 
2
 Apart from the small pocket of bigots who will always refuse to accept that practices of 
historical injustice such as colonialism were wrong, there are those who have profound 
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Questions of rectification for past injustice have been the subject of a great deal of 
attention in recent years.
3
 Many scholars have made major contributions to the way we 
approach the question of how best to heal the wounds of historical injustice, some of which 
are still open after many years. However it would appear that the current literature in political 
theory on historical injustice has tended to neglect what is arguably the most discernible 
aspect of this injustice, namely, the violence involved in the perpetration and administration 
of injustice. Perhaps it is precisely because the violence that has accompanied the injustice is 
so striking, and often so extreme in nature, that many authors writing on questions of 
historical injustice and its rectification have tended to overlook this aspect of the problem. 
This general trend to under-theorize the violence in historical injustice is regrettable, and a 
hindrance to a proper understanding of the phenomenon we are trying to explain, which 
consequently has made it more difficult to come to terms with a just principle for its 
rectification. 
 This article looks at one instance of historical injustice: colonialism. It suggests that the 
violence inflicted and suffered by the victims of colonialism reveals far more about this 
historical injustice than generally assumed. I will argue that in a colonial context injustice 
was perpetrated via the arbitrariness of violence, and that such arbitrariness reinforced the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
knowledge and understanding of such injustice but are concerned that fighting for 
rectification is not in the interest of the victims or survivors. This is the case of Frantz Fanon 
(1967), one of the most astute writers on colonialism in Africa, who fears that to be obsessed 
with demands for rectification for the injustice of the past will only make future generations 
‘prisoners of history’. 
3
 The literature is vast, but a few books stand out for originality and impact, including Butt 
(2008); McGary (1999); Robinson (2000); Thompson (2002); Torpey (2003). 
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domination of the colonizer over the colonized. Understanding the nature of the violence 
involved in colonial relations of domination is crucial in order to understand the full extent of 
the distinctive injustice of colonialism. Part I will look at some of the recent literature in 
political theory on colonialism, arguably one of the most discernible cases of historical 
injustice. This extensive body of literature tends to overlook the question of violence, to the 
extent that the distinctive wrongness of colonialism is generally disassociated from the 
violence of colonialism. Parts II and III will attempt to reverse this trend by suggesting that 
violence is paramount to a comprehensive understanding of the injustice of colonialism. 
Starting from the assumption that in the literature on historical wrongs acts of violence have 





 centuries reveals one fundamental dimension of social injustice; namely, the problem of 
arbitrariness. In other words, colonialism is a paradigmatic case of historical injustice in part 
because of the entrenched arbitrariness at the heart of its system, and this arbitrariness is fully 
revealed by the nature of violence exercised by those in power within a colonial context. Part 
IV will explore in more detail the questions whether colonialism is associated with a 
distinctive procedural wrong; I will argue that colonialism does indeed instantiate a 
distinctive kind of procedural wrong, but not for the reasons generally associated with this 
position: what is distinctive about colonialism can be traced back to the arbitrariness in the 
power relations it engendered. 
I. TAKING COLONIAL VIOLENCE SERIOUSLY. 
Contemporary political theory has developed a fascination for colonialism, and in particular 
why it is wrong. Of the many theorists that have engaged with this issue in recent years three 
in particular stand out: Margaret Moore (2015), Laura Valentini (2015) and Lea Ypi (2013). 
While they defend very different conceptions of the injustice of colonialism, each one making 
a valid and significant contribution to the literature, I will argue that their respective 
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arguments also share a common weakness, present in their tendency to underestimate the 
theoretical salience of violence as part of a comprehensive explanation of what makes 
historical injustice in general, and colonialism in particular, morally and politically wrong. 
My issue with Moore, Valentini and Ypi is not that they fail to recognize or 
acknowledge the violence that took place in history where colonialism flourished; no-one 
writing about colonialism could be indifferent to the brutality of colonialism, since any 
historical account of colonialism is imbued with descriptions of carnage, bloodshed and 
human cruelty beyond the limits of imagination. Instead my point is that the significance of 
violence in a moral assessment of the wrongness of colonialism is not given the theoretical 
import it deserves. In the works by Moore, Valentini and Ypi the violence symptomatic of 
colonialism tends not to be theorized, instead it is acknowledged and side-lined, as if this 
were something that can be taken for granted. As a result, in their otherwise sophisticated 
analysis of colonialism violence only makes a brief appearance before disappearing from 
their accounts of why colonialism is wrong. 
The received view in the literature on the injustice of colonialism seems to be that any 
violence that occurred was a contingent factor, not an inherent factor.
4
 In other words, while 
there was a great deal of unwarranted violence by colonial powers, the violence is not the 
distinctive reason why colonialism is wrong and unjust. It is precisely this point that I will 
attempt to refute in this article. 
Margaret Moore clearly sees violence as a contingent factor within the landscape of 
colonialism. Moore’s (2015) starting position is that the concept of territory is under-
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 For the distinction between inherent and contingent factors in the context of colonialism, 
see Moore (2016). 
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theorized in contemporary political theory.
5
 The essence of her argument is captured by the 
concept of self-determination, which justifies two moral rights: the individual moral right to 
residency, and the collective moral right to occupancy. This theoretical framework enables 
Moore to consider cases of historical injustice with respect to land, in particular the unlawful 
taking of land. This is an important issue of course, and Moore is right to highlight it, but 
what is disquieting about her approach is that she seems to be concerned exclusively with the 
fact that land was taken away from a people rather than the way the land was taken. In other 
words, Moore is untroubled (theoretically speaking) about the acts of violence involved in the 
appropriating of land, instead she is concerned only about the specific good that is being 
seized: land and territory. It follows that according to Moore (2015, 100) colonialism is 
wrong because the process of unlawfully and illegitimately taking of land disrupts our social 
attachments, and in the process undermines our self-determination: 
“Most people think that the wrong of colonialism isn’t captured just by the fact that the 
imperial authorities failed to include the colonial peoples fully in their political projects, 
and instead erected forms of political and legal domination over them…. This was part 
of the problem, to be sure, but we also think that a significant part of the problem was 
that the imperial powers were involved in the taking of territory…. The problem with 
colonialism wasn’t simply the violation of the equality condition (equal treatment of 
persons); it was that the imperial power was engaged in taking territorial rights from 
another people, through extending political authority (rules of justice) over them.” 
 Moore (2015, 160n4) explains why the violation of territorial rights is wrong in the 
following terms: “I am using the term ‘imperialism’ to refer to a situation where one group 
occupies the land of another, thereby violating their territorial rights, and also subjugates 
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 See also the special issue on her book in Philosophy and Public Issues (2017). 
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them, thereby denying them the capacity to be self-determining”. In the process of stressing 
why territorial issues are crucial to an understanding of the evils of colonialism, Moore 
downplays other important aspects, to the point where those other evils of colonialism are left 
out of the equation. Moore laments the fact that territory is under-theorized, but in her effort 
to put territory at the forefront of our analysis she ends up under-theorizing the violence of 
colonialism.  
It is surprising how the violence that accompanied colonialism is hardly mentioned by 
Moore, in fact the only place where Moore (2015, 140) makes a passing reference to the 
violence of colonialism is in the following passage:  
“We can identify at least four sorts of potential wrongs involved when land is taken, 
primarily through expelling people from their homes and communities, in addition to the 
coercion that usually accompanies such events: (1) being deprived of individual rights of 
residency; (2) being denied group rights of occupancy; (3) being denied collective self-
determination; and (4) having individual or collective property rights violated”.  
What is interesting about this passage is the way Moore deals with the abhorrent 
violence of colonialism. Moore merely touches on the ‘coercion’ that usually accompanies 
colonialism and imperialism, before leaving this issue aside and never returning to it. She 
goes on to consider what should be done to remedy territorial rights violation, since 
according to her that is the main issue to be confronted. The fact that the violence of 
colonialism plays a minor role in Moore’s argument about the wrongful taking of land and 
territory is not inconsequential.  
Someone who is not convinced by the territorial approach is Lea Ypi (2013). In what is 
arguably the most influential, and original, philosophical accounts of why colonialism is 
wrong in recent years, Ypi argues that while of course there are many reasons why 
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colonialism is wrong, there is one fundamental and distinctive reason that defines the intrinsic 
wrongness of colonialism: the creation and upholding of a political association that denies its 
members equal and reciprocal terms of cooperation. 
Ypi is probably right that the wrong of colonialism should be disentangled from 
considerations of nationalism and territorial rights, and that we need to pay more attention to 
the fact that colonialism denies equal and reciprocal terms of cooperation, even though the 
bulk of her article tends to be a critique of the territorial rights perspective rather than giving 
a detailed account and justification of what equality and reciprocity in political relations 
actually entails. What is surprising about Ypi’s analysis, and what needs closer inspection, is 
Ypi’s comments on the violence that colonialism inevitably unleashed. Ypi (2013, 162) has 
this to say on the question:  
“Burning native settlements, torturing innocents, slaughtering children, enslaving 
entire populations, exploiting the soil and natural resources available to them, and 
discriminating on grounds of ethnicity and race are only some of the most familiar 
horrors associated with it. The suggestion that the wrong of colonialism consists in its 
embodiment of an objectionable form of political relation is far from implying that 
this can now be forgotten. This article tries to clarify what is wrong with colonialism, 
over and above these familiar outrages. Although an account focusing on the brutality 
of this practice would capture most of the wrong of colonialism (especially when 
examined in historical perspective), it would leave unchallenged more subtle forms of 
it”.  
The way Ypi theorizes the relationship between the violence of colonialism and its 
injustice is slightly perplexing. Of course Ypi is well aware that the history of colonialism is 
full of horrors and atrocities, in fact she states that the ‘brutality’ of colonialism captures 
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‘most of the wrong’ with this practice, but one gets the impression that according to Ypi the 
brutalities and ‘the most familiar horrors’ are so evident that superficially they attract all the 
attention to the detriment of more fundamental issues that regularly get overlooked. In other 
words, it would appear that for Ypi the horrors associated with colonialism appear to be 
either merely instrumental or accidental to the injustice: ‘instrumental’ in the sense that the 
violence is nothing more than a means to the injustice, and ‘accidental’ in the sense that the 
violence is a bi-product of the injustice. Instead Ypi believes that the distinctive injustice of 
colonialism is to be found elsewhere, in an aspect of the colonialism that is less obvious, or to 
use her own words, ‘more subtle’. 
 In the only other passage where Ypi (2013, 167) touches on the horrific violence and 
brutality of colonialism, she explains why we should not look at territorial entitlement to 
understand why colonialism is wrong:  
“If the wrong of colonialism is reduced to a violation of territorial rights, settlement 
practices appear very difficult to criticize. This is not to say that we cannot condemn 
such practices for what they have historically produced: mass murder, ethnic cleansing, 
racial discrimination, the exploitation of labor and resources, and the enslavement of 
huge parts of the earth’s population…..But this critique would take us closer to the idea 
that the wrong of colonialism consists in its embodying an objectionable form of 
political relation, not in the occupation of others’ land”.  
From this passage it appears that Ypi identifies the abhorrent violence that was a regular 
feature of colonialism, and even recognizes that this violence is part of what makes 
colonialism wrong, but according to Ypi there is something that makes colonialism 
specifically wrong, which has nothing to do with the violence: acts of colonial violence are 
already considered wrongs in their own right (whether or not as part of colonial practices), 
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therefore the distinctive wrong of colonialism must be something other than these wrongs, 
and can be characterized as an objectionable form of political relation. In other words Ypi 
seems to suggest that what is distinctively wrong with colonialism can be divorced from the 
violence of colonialism.  
Of course there is more to the injustice of colonialism than its abhorrent violence, and in 
her analysis of colonialism Ypi has pinpointed a crucial aspect of this injustice, yet one could 
argue that Ypi fails to appreciate the extent to which colonial violence is integral to the 
injustice of colonialism. Perhaps it is because of the disturbingly obvious nature of the 
atrocities being committed in the name of colonialism that a tendency to under-theorize the 
violence associated with colonialism has become the received view, with the result that 
violence is consigned to a supporting role in terms of understanding the injustice of this 
practice. In Parts III and IV below I will argue that the violence and horrors of colonialism 
cannot be disassociated from other aspects of the injustice of colonialism, in fact even Ypi’s 
argument that colonialism is wrong because it denies its members equal and reciprocal terms 
of cooperation finds support and elucidation in the nature of colonial violence.  
Perhaps this tendency amongst political theorists not to appreciate the full significance of 
violence, being unaware that it can reveal something unique about the wrongness of 
colonialism, is nowhere more marked that in Laura Valentini’s work. This is the opening line 
of Valentini’s (2015, 312) article on colonialism:  “Colonialism is associated with many all-
too-familiar wrongs: oppression, exploitation, murder, racism, and dehumanization, among 





 Given that Valentini’s central thesis is that there is nothing distinctively unique 
about the wrongness of colonialism, instead “the wrong of colonialism is exhausted by the 
‘sum’ of these familiar wrongs – wrongs that are not necessarily tied to colonialism” (ibid), 
her decision not to engage with colonialism’s most repugnant trait and legacy is not 
altogether surprising. One aim of this article is to suggest that Valentini, like Moore and Ypi 
before her, is missing something important by dismissing the violence of colonialism as a 
contingent phenomenon theoretically not very interesting or revealing about the distinctive 
wrongness of this historical phenomenon. 
I will return to Moore, Valentini and Ypi’s accounts of why colonialism is wrong in Parts 
III and IV below, but first the assumption that there are benefits of thinking about the 
historical injustice of colonialism in terms of historical violence needs to be vindicated. 
II. SWEET AND BRUTAL: COLONIALISM IN THE CARIBBEAN. 
No one would, or should, doubt that colonialism represents a quintessential case of historical 
injustice, and those who insist in denying it are merely being intellectually dishonest and can 
therefore be ignored without compromising the integrity of this analysis. Colonialism is a 
complex issue, with many diverse historical representations and therefore conceptually 
difficult to capture. In what follows the focus will switch to one specific historical case-study, 
which is exemplary of the experience of colonialism in many corners of the world over many 
centuries: the colonization by the English of the Caribbean in the 17
th
 century. The 
development of sugar plantations in the Caribbean between 1605 (date of the first English 
attempt to settle in the Caribbean at St.Lucia, which failed due to the hostility of native 
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 The only other time that violence appears in her article is on page 313, where Valentini 
mentions Ypi’s passing reference to the brutality and violence of colonialism merely to 
reinforce the point that the violence is not what makes colonialism distinctively wrong. 
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Caribs) and 1807 (the year of the abolition of the slave trade act) is an important case-study 
for economic historians, given that for centuries sugar was as lucrative for plantation owners 
as oil is for us today. But the history of the Caribbean is also conceptually important for 
political theorists to the extent that it exposes colonialism in its crudest and most brutal form. 
There is nothing exceptional about the history of the Caribbean, except that in this historical 
context the logic of colonialism was allowed to unfold almost unhindered until it reached its 
most extreme manifestation, and therefore its purest form. The extreme nature of this case-
study clearly shows why colonialism, as a more general ideal-type, is morally wrong, and 
essentially unjust. Furthermore the zealous violence in the historical context of colonialism in 
the Caribbean is not merely a contingent factor, but reveals a distinctive feature of the 
wrongness of colonialism. 
 Before we turn to the history of colonialism in the Caribbean, a word about the term 
‘violence’. A detailed analysis of the concept of violence is beyond the scope of this article, 
but the following working definition of violence as a violation of integrity will be used: An 
act of violence occurs when the integrity or unity of a subject (person or animal) or object 
(property) is being intentionally or unintentionally violated, as a result of an action or an 
omission. The violation may occur at the physical or psychological level, through physical or 
psychological means. A Violation of integrity will usually result in the subject being harmed 
or injured, or the object being destroyed or damaged.
7
 
 ‘Integrity’ here simply refers to something that has not been broken, or that has not lost 
its original form. This is integrity as wholeness or completeness, or as MacCallum (2009) 
explains, the quality or state of being complete or undivided. Bodily integrity is also one of 
Martha Nussbaum’s (1999) ten central human capabilities, a necessary condition for self-
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 I argue for this definition of violence in Bufacchi (2007), see also Bufacchi (2009). 
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determination. Violence can be defined as a violation of integrity to the extent that violence 
damages or destroys a pre-existing unity. Susan Brison (2002) argues that when a person 
survives an act of sexual violence, it is their integrity as a person that is being infringed, since 
in the process of being violated they are reduced to a lesser being, in both somatic and 
psychological terms. 
 As a single act of violence against a person, such as the rape of an indigenous woman by 
one or more colonizers, the violation of integrity in question is experienced by the survivors 
of sexual violence who, to use Susan Brison’s terminology, are ‘being undone by violence’, 
in the sense that after such ordeal the self is ‘demolished’, ‘shattered’, ‘undermined’, and ‘the 
connection between the self and the rest of humanity is severed’. There is a lot more to 
violence than the physical pain it inflicts; violence is the enactment of domination, the 
performance of supremacy. The integrity which is destroyed by an act of violence is not 
limited to individual or personal cases, but also applies at the group level. The violence 
intrinsic to much historical injustice not only shatters individual lives, but also the cultural 
(and perhaps national) integrity of groups, which are forced to give up their customs, beliefs 
and traditions in accordance with the diktats of the agents of injustice.  
 Colonialism is a perfect example of historical injustice as violation of integrity. In his 
analysis of Gandhi’s reflections on the injustice of colonialism, Vivek Dhareshwar (2011, 65) 
suggests that we see colonialism as an onslaught on the integrity of experience: “Gandhi was 
convinced that colonialism is destructive of the very integrity of experience….anyone faced 
with the onslaught of colonialism would understand what that means and would have had to 
find a way of preserving the integrity of his/her way of life in the face of the onslaught….The 
question of how to live and how to go about in the world in such a way that the integrity of 
experience is preserved is, Gandhi discovered, the central preoccupation that shaped the form 
of life – Indian civilization, to use his term – that was being undermined by colonialism and 
13 
 
its civilization. So, the defence of that form of life meant the defence of the integrity of 
experience itself, for Gandhi clearly saw colonialism as an attempt to ‘argue us out of our 
experience’”. Dhareshwar perfectly captures the essence of Gandhi’s sense of the injustice of 
colonialism, which not only puts violence at the forefront of the meaning of colonialism, but 
draws attention to the violation of integrity that is symptomatic of the wrongness of violence 
and the injustice of colonialism. 
 On the basis of this definition of violence, we can now look at colonialism in the 
Caribbean in more detail. In Sugar & Slaves, Richard Dunn’s seminal work on life in the 
Caribbean between 1624 and 1713, we get a glimpse of the life of the African slaves (and 
native Caribs) in the sugar plantations. As Gary Nash points out in the foreword to this 
significant study: “in the main, enslaved Africans lived unspeakably difficult lives, dying 
prematurely, struggling futilely to resist brutalization, and in the end awaiting deliverance at 
the hands of their oppressors” (p.xix). This echoes Richard Dunn’s (2000, 224) assessment 
that “the seventeenth-century English sugar planters created one of the harshest systems of 
servitude in Western history”, a system more profoundly oppressive and more socially 
divisive than Graeco-Roman slavery or medieval serfdom, but while this is perhaps common 
knowledge (and if it isn’t, it should be), something else comes to the surface when we 
examine the relationship between planters and slaves. 
 ‘The Barbados Act for the Better Ordering and Governing of Negroes’, passed in 1661 
by the Barbados Assembly is a case in point. Perhaps unsurprising the premise of this 
document is that Negroes are characterizes as “an heathen, brutish and an uncertaine, 
dangerous kinde of people”, but what is remarkable, and revealing, about this document is the 
way it recognizes that Negroes require the protection from the arbitrary cruelty of their 
masters. Thus the Barbados Act says that the slaves cannot be left “to the Arbitrary, cruell 
and outrageous wills of every evill disposed person” (quoted in Dunn 2000, 239). 
14 
 
Commenting on the same Act, Matthew Parker (2012, 148) points out that while on paper the 
Act aimed to protect the slaves, “masters could punish slaves in any way they liked, even to 
death, the only penalty being a fine, and this was easily evaded”.  
 The Barbados Act is very clear on one, fundamental point: it is not just the cruel, 
outrageous and evil punishments suffered by slaves that were being acknowledged as a 
problem, but the arbitrariness in which punishments were dispensed and performed. The 
brutality is legendary: slave punishments included being whipped, branded, castrated, having 
their nose slit, rubbing lash wounds with melted wax, lopping off half of a slave’s foot with 
an axe, having the tongue cut out, a leg chopped off, or impaling the slave’s body with stakes 
and slowly burning him alive. The issue is not so much the level of cruelty, often gratuitous 
and disproportional to the crime even by 17
th
 century standards. Instead what is significant is 
that the arbitrariness is so prevalent to have become institutionalized. Dunn (2000, 239) 
reminds us that “the master could correct his slaves in any way he liked, and if while beating 
a Negro for a misdemeanour he happened to maim or kill him … he suffered no penalty”. 
This was so common it eventually became a problem, so much so that at least in theory (but 
seldom in practice) a master could be fined for “wantonly killing his slave”.
8
 In the Leeward 
Islands, a law was passed in 1675 which tried to make slave owners pay compensation for the 
many Negroes they had “frivolously” killed. The terminology used in those legal texts is 
unambiguous: ‘wanton’ and ‘frivolous’ killings suggest a level of arbitrariness that was not 
only counterproductive (for colonial rulers), but also dangerous. 
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 The Barbados code was introduced in Jamaica in 1664, where previously Negroes were 
tried and put to death without due process, but merely on the advice of two neighbours of the 
slave’s master. Dunn (2000, 243, emphasis added) comments: “No other English statute of 
the century stated quite so nakedly the white man’s arbitrary determination of black crime”.  
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 We get a glimpse of the extreme nature of arbitrariness and violence in the context of 
colonialism in Thomas Thistlewood’s personal diaries. Thistlewood settled in Jamaica in 
1750, and lived there until his death in 1786, first as an overseer, and then as a small 
landowner, with his own slaves. Two aspects of his diaries are particularly pertinent: his 
brutality, and insatiable sexual drive. On both accounts slaves were his victims. 
 Thistlewood was the designer of a grotesque punishment which involved making one 
slave defecate in the mouth of another slave, who was then gagged for four to five hours. 
Known as ‘Derby’s dose’, after the name of the slave who suffered the abuse, this was seen 
as a fitting punishment for having stolen food, or in the case of Derby, being caught eating 
young sugar cane stalks. Another punishment he conceived involved flogging a slave in 
stocks, rubbing molasses on the wounds, and letting insects to swarm over him during the 
night. 
According to Trevor Burnard (2004), the violence and brutality that Thistlewood 
promulgated with equal measures of pride and callousness were not incidental to Jamaican 
slavery. On the contrary, they were the essence of colonization.
9
 The fact that white 
landowners were a small minority of the population compared to the vast majority of slaves 
working in the sugar plantations was not insignificant, and Thistlewood was a firm believer 
that tyranny and dominance were interconnected. 
Dominance was also the motivation behind the perpetual sexual abuses chronicled in 
Thistlewood’s diaries; 138 slave women were the victims of Thistlewood’s predatory sexual 
exploitation. Burnard (2004, 160 emphasis added) explains that Thistlewood used sex for 
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 The brutality in the Congo Free State at the end of the 19
th
 century by the Belgian 
authorities, especially in the rubber industry, is as severe and disturbing as what occurred in 
the Caribbean. On Congo, see Jody P. Smith (2014).  
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realizing the dominance of master over slave, since according to Thistlewood the institutional 
dominance of white men had to be translated into personal dominance: “Slave owners needed 
to show that they were strong, violent, virile men who ruled the little kingdoms of white 
autocracy that were Jamaican plantations as they pleased. What better way for white men to 
show who was in control then for them to have the pick of black women whenever they 
chose”. 
Once again, the language used by Burnard is unequivocal: arbitrariness was part of the 
violence, and violence was a type of dominance. The fact that the arbitrary violence was 
directed to slaves of African origin doesn’t mean that this is exclusively an issue of ‘slavery’ 
and not of ‘colonialism’. First of all, slavery has always been an integral part of the colonial 
project. Secondly, in colonial contexts the smaller indigenous population suffered the same 
fate as slaves; Parker (2012, 99) reminds us that the Tainos, sometimes called Arawaks, had 
been in Jamaica for some 2500 years, but were virtually wiped out by the English and 
Spanish settlers: “Enslaved by the Spaniards, tens of thousands also died of overwork or 
wanton cruelty at the hands of their masters. Rather than live as slaves, many killed 
themselves, and women aborted their children…by the time the English arrived just under 60 
years later, they were almost all gone”.
10
 
III. DOMINATION, ARBITRARINESS AND INJUSTICE. 
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 Sugar production was extremely labour intensive. By the end of the 17
th
 century the 
English settlers had brought a quarter of a million Negroes from Africa to Barbados, Jamaica 
and the Leeward Islands alone. There is every reason to believe that the indigenous 
population would have had the same cruel and ‘arbitrary’ treatment had they been numerous 
enough to do the same hard work required to produce sugar (and rum).  
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The history of colonization in the Caribbean points to gross injustice characterized by 
distinctively arbitrary brutal violence. That arbitrariness is symptomatic of injustice is per se 
not a new idea, although until now political theorists writing on the injustice of colonialism 
have failed to appreciate the fact that arbitrariness is crucial to a proper understanding of 
what makes colonialism wrong. 
In Anglo-American political theory the injustice of arbitrariness is usually traced back to 
the work of John Locke. In The Second Treatise of Government Locke makes repeated use of 
the term ‘arbitrary’, usually in relation to absolute power; clearly according to Locke one of 
the risks with absolute monarchy is that those in power exercise their authority without 
impartiality.
11
  More recently the idea that arbitrariness is potentially the enemy of justice has 
come under scrutiny by David Schmidz (2006), Philip Pettit (1997) and Frank Lovett (2010). 
Schmidtz reminds us that the term arbitrariness has two meanings: randomness (where 
no choice is made) and capriciousness (where unprincipled choices are made); according to 
Schmidtz, and to the indignation of Rawlsian advocates of luck egalitarianism, only the latter 
type of arbitrariness is problematic from a moral point of view. The idea of arbitrariness also 
appears in Philip Pettit’s influential idea of domination. According to Pettit, three necessary 
conditions define domination: (1) the capacity to interfere, (2) on an arbitrary basis, (3) in 
certain choices that the other is in a position to make. Pettit (1997, 52) elaborates on the 
condition of arbitrariness when he explains that interference is arbitrary “if it is subject just to 
the arbitrium, the decision or judgment, of the agent [who interferes]; the agent was in a 
position to choose it or not choose it, at their pleasure”. Furthermore, the interests or opinions 
of those affected are irrelevant. 
                                                          
11




While Pettit can be credited for re-introducing arbitrariness in the lexicon of justice, the 
most thorough analysis of the notion of arbitrariness within the context of domination can be 
found in Frank Lovett’s (2010) A General Theory of Domination and Justice. Lovett starts 
from the assumption that imbalance of social power is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
of domination. What makes domination distinctively unjust is what Lovett calls the 
‘arbitrariness condition’. Lovett (2010, 96) goes on to explain that arbitrariness in this context 
is not merely randomness, unpredictability, or discretionary powers (although all of the above 
are legitimate meanings), but something more sinister: “More precisely, let us define social 
power as arbitrary to the extent that its potential exercise is not externally constrained by 
effective rules, procedures, or goals that are common knowledge of all persons or groups 
concerned. Arbitrariness, so defined, is not merely an excessive form of discretion”. 
It is not surprising perhaps that Lovett (2010, 100) uses slavery on more than one 
occasion as an example of what he calls the arbitrary power conception of domination: 
“Slavery again provides an easy case: in most slave systems, there was little a slave master 
was not permitted to do to those slaves in his possession. Moreover, what few limitations 
were imposed by law were frequently ineffective”. The same logic applies to colonialism, 
which in part explains why historically slavery and colonialism were so closely related, one 






Arbitrariness is an inherent feature of colonialism, and the injustice of colonialism has a 
lot to do with the injustice of arbitrariness. In the colonial context the arbitrariness of power 
takes different forms, but it is most clearly evident in the level and nature of brutal violence 
which historically has unfailingly accompanied colonial wars and territorial gains. The 
violence of colonization is morally significant not (merely) because of its brutality, but 
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because of its arbitrariness. Putting arbitrariness at the forefront of our ethical assessment 
fundamentally changes the way we view colonization. 
 Margaret Moore suggests that we should distinguish between features that are contingent 
to colonialism or those that are inherent to it. At one level one could argue that while a great 
deal of violence accompanied colonisation, the violence was contingent to the extent that we 
could imagine a colonial relationship that is structured in relations of domination and 
subordination, and the taking of territory, but didn’t involve violence, therefore violence is 
not inherent to colonialism. What is inherent to colonialism, and what makes it wrong 
according to Moore (2016, 456), is the taking of the territory, which robs the indigenous 
people of control over their collective lives, and disable them from exercising robust forms of 
self-determination: “lack of control will be disruptive of all aspects of their life. This is 
indeed a serious injustice, because it disrespects them as people with a particular collective 
identity and attachment to and relationship with the land on which they live”. 
  There is, however, an alternative explanation. It is important to remember that the issue 
here is not descriptive but normative. The point is not merely to decipher the meaning of 
colonization, which by definition is a territorial issue, but to evaluate the ethics of it: what 
makes colonialism an injustice. The territorial occupation is a necessary condition of 
colonization, but ethically the injustice is not about the territory; it is about the power 
relations that are being imposed by an outside group on the indigenous population. There is 
an element of arbitrariness (as unpredictability) in the decision to invade a certain territory at 
a certain moment in time, resulting in more arbitrariness (as unconstrained social power) in 
the relations that ensue between colonizers and colonized. That is why arbitrariness is not a 
contingent but an inherent feature of colonial domination. And in a colonial context, arbitrary 
violence was the preferred method of reinforcing and institutionalize domination. 
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IV. THE DISTINCTIVE INJUSTICE OF COLONIALISM. 
The violence that accompanied colonialism throughout history is not a mere historical 
footnote; violence is theoretically significant, especially for an inquiry on the injustice of 
colonialism. The nature of the violence that takes place in the context of colonization is an 
extreme act of arbitrariness. Violence is used not just to punish, or humiliate, but to enforce 
the law of arbitrary power. The victims and survivors of colonization are victims of an 
injustice, to the extent that their existence is dictated by the wanton, frivolous desires of those 
with power over them. Arbitrary violence is what makes colonialism not just an episode of 
state or individual wrongful action, but one of structural injustice;
12
 colonial violence is the 
heart of darkness. 
 Of all the recent literature on colonialism, Lea Ypi comes closest to capturing the 
injustice of colonialism in terms of the creation and upholding of a political association that 
denies its members equal and reciprocal terms of cooperation. Ypi’s thesis is fundamentally 
correct, although it has recently come under severe critical scrutiny. I believe Ypi’s thesis can 
be vindicated if the inadequate political association that characterizes colonialism is seen 
through the lenses of the arbitrariness of power. Such arbitrariness was made possible, and 
institutionalized, both legally and culturally, via the most extreme forms of violence. Finding 
a place for the historical violence of colonialism, and its arbitrariness, in a normative 
evaluation of why colonialism is wrong, is also important for the sake of initiating a discourse 
on the ways of rectifying for the injustice of colonialism. Understanding the role of historical 
violence within the context of historical injustice has the advantage of projecting the 
relevance of historical injustice from the past into the present and the future, hence historical 
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 See Lu (2011). 
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injustice is not simply something that we should be concerned with for the sake of history, 
but because of the way that its violence is still present with us today.
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 Not everyone agrees with Ypi that colonialism always instantiates a distinctive kind of 
procedural wrong. Valentini (2016) resists this conclusion, arguing that colonialism is 
procedurally wrong, although there is no distinctive procedural wrong of colonialism. 
Valentini’s argument is meticulous, therefore in what follows I’ll focus on only one (major) 
aspect of her complex analysis. Valentini distinguishes between an ‘aggregate’ and a 
‘corporate’ account of the potentially distinctive procedural wrong of colonialism, suggesting 
that neither interpretation is convincing. Regarding the former, Valentini highlights four 
reasons why, according to Ypi, colonialism is distinctively wrong: lack of voluntary consent; 
members unequal subjection to colonial laws (and unequal capacity to change it); colonial 
law’s negative impact on future generations of victims of historical injustice; colonial laws’ 
inadequate manner of ‘tracking the will’ of historically wronged groups. Valentini then 
proceeds to discard all four reasons; her detailed analysis is both informative and, at least at 
first appearance, convincing; if she is right, then Ypi’s argument that colonialism represents a 
distinctive procedural wrong is untenable. 
 There are two ways to rescue Ypi’s argument from Valentini’s attack. One strategy is to 
go over each of the four points Valentini rejects, and present counter arguments. I’ll leave 
this to others (Ypi perhaps) to attempt this feat. Instead, I want to pursue another strategy. 
What Ypi perhaps should have said, but failed to say, is that at the heart of the distinctively 
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 See Mbembe (1992, 3) on the violence which the colonial relationship, par excellence, 
involves: “the postcolony is also made up of a series of corporate institutions and a political 
machinery which, once they are in place, constitute a distinctive regime of violence”. I am 
grateful to Anne Phillips for alerting me to Mbembe’s work. 
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procedural wrongness of colonialism is the arbitrariness of colonial laws. In other words, 
while colonial powers have no interest in seeking voluntary consent, it is not the lack of 
voluntary consent that makes colonialism stand out, since this is a feature of many other 
forms of injustice. Instead it is the arbitrary nature of colonial laws that is a distinctive 
feature, and what makes colonialism distinctively wrong. In the context of colonialism, 
arbitrariness is ubiquitous. The extreme and brutal violence that defines experiences of 
colonialism is per se contingent, since many cases of historical injustice are also accompanied 
by unnecessary suffering, but the arbitrariness in which violence was orchestrated under 
colonialism is distinctive. So contra Valentini, perhaps Ypi was right after all to argue that 
colonialism always instantiates a distinctive kind of procedural wrong, even though Ypi did 
not fully appreciate the political function of arbitrariness which makes this type of injustice 
distinctive. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
Domination is the chief cause of the injustice of colonialism, but that’s not all. This article 
suggested that it is the arbitrary nature of the power relations of domination between 
colonizers and the colonized which is at the heart of the injustice of colonization, and 
violence was the way arbitrariness and domination was cemented. 
 Violence makes the victims and survivors feel vulnerable, violated, degraded and 
inferior to the perpetrators of violence, morally and politically. Being the subject of arbitrary 
violence undermines a person’s self-respect, self-esteem, and epistemic status. Violence 
captures the unequal relationship of power between perpetrators and victims or survivors, 
exposing the powerlessness of the latter. Alessandro Salice (2014, 161) suggests that there is 
more to violence than the causing of harm, since violence is first and foremost a social act, 
characterized by the desire to establish a social relation of violence in which what matters is 
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that the victim realizes that the aggressor intends to harm them: in performing an act of 
violence “one is inflicting harm on the victim with the concomitant intention that the victim 
becomes aware of the damage and of its ‘author’”.  
 Understanding violence as a social act is important for many reasons, not least because it 
puts the lack of equality and reciprocity in political relations lamented by Ypi within a 
context of violence. Like violence, equality and reciprocity are social phenomena. Acts of 
arbitrary violence generally reveal unjust relations of domination, oppression and 
misrecognition. Any debate about the best way to rectify historical injustice must take into 
account the violence at the heart of the injustice, its arbitrariness, and enduring qualities. 
Violence is not an exclusive property of colonial states, since violence, and especially state 
violence, can also be found in democratic states and societies. But in the context of 
colonialism the violence is fundamentally different from the violence that one finds in a 
democracy. The difference is the arbitrary nature of colonial violence, and arbitrariness is 
what makes colonialism not just wrong but distinctively so.  
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